Answer all four questions. Please observe the length limitation. Your grades will be affected if you do not obey the instruction given.

1. The following passage is adapted from Paul Bloom's Descartes' Baby.   Write a summary of 100 words for this passage. (25%)

Are our moral emotions, shaped by natural selection, the beginning and end of our notions of right and wrong? It certainly does not seem that way. Humans have self-control, we have language, we are conscious, we can think about the past and future, and, *most* of all, we can reason about morality, using our intelligence to supplement and sometimes override our evolved instincts.

At the very minimum, for example, everyone would agree that it is wrong to kill a healthy baby, sufficiently so that a society should have laws in place to forbid it. But when we deal with those who are not yet born, the issue is no longer so clear. Some believe that abortion is never acceptable. Others believe that stem-cell research should be permitted, or that abortion is acceptable in the first two trimesters but not in' the third. Most people, when asked to justify their position, cite *reasons*. The fetus, even early on, is a human life and it is wrong to destroy a human.... The zygote is a clump of cells, nothing more, but once it grows to be viable, it becomes worthy of protection ... Life begins at conception.... Life begins at birth. The psychologists Elliot Turiel and Kristin Neff have concluded that "people who differ in their views on abortion do not differ in their judgments about the value of life. Rather, they make different assumptions about when life begins."

To take a different case, the legal scholar Richard Posner argues that we are more permissive toward homosexuals and homosexual acts than we used to be just because we now know more about homosexuality. In medieval times, homosexuals were thought to be responsible for earthquakes. People used to believe that sexual orientation is a choice; now it is seen as largely genetically based and involuntary. The problem with those who discriminate against homosexuals, suggests Posner, is that they do not know any better.

This is a cheerful outlook. It suggests that as our knowledge grows, we will come to better understand moral issues such as abortion and sexual behavior. This path to moral enlightenment might be disrupted by factors such as self-interest, prejudice, and blind submission to authority, but in the end, these issues will be resolved by scientific advances and reasoned debate. The extreme version of this position was held by Immanuel Kant, who proposed that moral duty can be determined solely through a reasoning process that is autonomous from drives and emotions.

Now consider a very different perspective. Many psychologists and philosophers argue that the rational basis of moral thought is an illusion. As the philosopher David Hume famously said, "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." In his summary of a Darwinian theory of the evolution of morals, the writer Robert Wright claims that "our ethereal intuitions about what's right and what's wrong are weapons designed for daily, hand-to-hand combat among individuals." And the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt concludes that "moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post-hoc

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construction, generated after a judgment has been reached."

From this perspective, the development of a moral sense is just like the development of a language. Some facts about languages are unlearned and universal, such as the existence of words and sentences; others vary across human groups and have to be learned, such as the order in which words are put together to form sentences. There is a certain period in which people are most able to learn language - if you try to learn after this period {which ends roughly at puberty}, you are unlikely to speak like a native. Language learning is the product of cultural immersion, not rational choice. After all, children in Japan learn Japanese because the people around them speak the language, not because they have come to a rational decision that Japanese is better than the alternatives. In fact, all languages do an equally good job of communicating complex thoughts: the languages of Europe are not superior to those of Africa; the languages of industrial societies are not more complicated than those of isolated hunter-gatherers.

Perhaps it is the same with morality. There are universals-killing babies is wrong -- and there are views particular to cultures. For many fundamentalist Christians, homosexuality is immoral and physical punishment of children is not; for many secular Americans and Europeans, it is the other way around. There is a certain period during which these culturally specific notions are best learned from parents and peers (late childhood and adolescence). And to say that one moral system is objectively superior to another is just as chauvinistic and silly as saying that one language (English? Latin?Hindi?) is superior to the rest.

2. The following passage is about linguistic contact. According to this passage, how does language death take place? Your answer should not exceed 100 words.   (25%)

As a consequence of linguistic contact, speakers often give up their native language in favor of another, more prestigious form of speech, whether the latter be the language of a foreign conqueror, a link language, a koine, a creole, or perhaps even a pidgin. While this much has been known for a long time, the manner in which linguistic communities switch language 'loyalties' and the effects of this switch on linguistic structure were only poorly understood. Traditional linguistic literature may mention the date at which 'the last speaker' of a given language died. But it does not examine questions like 'Who did that last speaker speak to?' or 'What was his/her language like?'

It is only fairly recently that research has begun into this aspect of language contact, which now is referred to as **language** death. As a consequence, findings are limited in number and spotty in terms of the languages and the aspects of grammar that have been studied. Nevertheless, certain very general patterns are beginning to emerge:

Language death commonly does not take place suddenly, within just one generation. Rather, it is a slow process which may extend over more than three generations. Its basis is bilingualism of a sort where a

non-native language is considered more prestigious or useful, or may be required in certain contexts (such as school or dealing with governmental authorities). As a consequence, the non-native language begins to be used with increasing frequency and in increasingly larger social contexts, while the native language is employed less frequently and in fewer contexts.

Reduction in use in turn reduces the 'input' on which new speakers of the language can draw in order to formulate their own internalized grammar. While this may not affect the most common constructions in the language, its effects can be greater on structures which are less frequently used. These may now be heard so rarely that learners find it difficult, if not impossible, to internalize rules which correctly account for them.

As a consequence, the new generation of speakers may avoid using such constructions, thus further reducing the input for the next generation of speakers, and so on. In this manner, then, the rule system of the language undergoes a slow process of atrophy. (Studies on language death in very different locations, focusing on very different grammatical phenomena, agree on the fact that grammatical attrition is not across the board or random, but that it takes place in terms of the 'fading out' of rules and that in this process, certain, apparently more 'marked' or 'difficult' rules are lost first.)

What is interesting is that grammatical atrophy is not matched by a similar decrease in vocabulary or in the younger generations' ability to understand older speakers. Passive and active command of the language thus may differ considerably. At a certain point, the atrophy in the grammatical system 'progresses' to the point that a new generation of speakers no longer is able to formulate an internalized grammar, even to their own satisfaction. The members of this generation, often referred to as 'semi-speakers', fluently understand even their grandparents' speech, but will generally admit that they are unable to speak the language themselves. At this point, then, the transmission of the language has come to an end, the language has effectively died.

3. The following passage is adapted from *The King's English, 3rd ed.* Please read it carefully and answer the following questions:

a) Identify the types of metaphor according to the classification made by the author of the passage. **(8%)**
   1) 'a *gap* in our fiscal system'
   2) 'this reassuring declaration *knocks* the *bottom out* of the plea of urgency';

b) Based on the passage, please discuss in **less than 100 words** your understanding of the following statement: **(12%)**

> It is necessary to warn one against over-indulgence in the use of live metaphor that is not intentional. The many words and phrases that fall under this class are all convenient; as often as not they are the first that

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occur, and it is laborious, sometimes impossible, to hit upon an equivalent.

Strictly speaking, metaphor occurs as often as we take a word out of its original sphere and apply it to new circumstances. In this sense almost all words can be shown to be metaphorical when they do not bear a physical meaning; for the original meaning of almost all words can be traced back to something physical. Words had to be found to express mental perceptions, abstract ideas, and complex relations, for which a primitive vocabulary did not provide; and the obvious course was to convey the new idea by means of the nearest physical parallel. The commonest Latin verb for *think* is a metaphor from vine-pruning; 'seeing' of the mind is borrowed from literal sight; 'pondering' is metaphorical 'weighing'. Evidently these metaphors differ in intention and effect from such a phrase as 'smouldering' discontent; the former we may call, for want of a better word, 'natural' metaphor, as opposed to the latter, which is artificial. The word metaphor as ordinarily used suggests only the artificial kind: but in deciding on the merits or demerits of a metaphorical phrase we are concerned as much with the one class as the other; for in all doubtful cases our first questions will be, what was the writer's intention in using the metaphor? Is it his own, or is it common property? if the latter, did he use it consciously or unconsciously?

This distinction, however, is useful only as leading up to another. We cannot use it directly as a practical test: artificial metaphors, as well as natural ones, often end by becoming a part of ordinary language; when this has happened, there is no telling to which class they belong, and in English the question is complicated by the fact that our metaphorical vocabulary is largely borrowed from Latin in the metaphorical state. Take such a word as *explain*: its literal meaning is 'spread out flat': how are we to say now whether necessity or picturesqueness first prompted its metaphorical use? And the same doubt might arise centuries hence as to the origin of a phrase so obviously artificial to us as 'glaring inconsistency'.

Our practical distinction will therefore be between conscious or 'living' and unconscious or 'dead' metaphor, whether natural or artificial in origin: and again, among living metaphors, we shall distinguish between the intentional, which are designed for effect, and the unintentional, which, though still felt to be metaphors, are used merely as a part of the ordinary vocabulary. It may seem at first sight that this classification leaves us where we were: how can we know whether a writer uses a particular metaphor consciously or unconsciously? We cannot know for certain: it is enough if we think that he used it consciously, and know that we should have used it consciously ourselves; experience will tell us how far our perceptions in this respect differ from other people's. Most readers, we think, will agree in the main with our classification of the following instances; they are taken at random from a couple of pages of the *Spectator*.

These we should call dead: 'his *views* were personal'; '*carry out* his policy'; 'not *acceptable* to his *colleagues*'; 'the Chancellor *proposed*'; 'some *grounds* for complaint'; '*refrain* from talking about them'; '*sound* policy'; 'a speech almost entirely *composed* of *extracts*'; '*discussion*'; '*falls* due'; '*succeeded*'; 'will *approach* their task'; '*delivered* a speech'; '*postponing* to a future year'. The next are living, but not intentional metaphor; the writer is aware that his phrase is still picturesque in effect, but has not chosen it for that reason: 'a Protestant *atmosphere*'; 'this would leave a *margin* of £122,000'; 'the loss of *elasticity*' in the Fund; '*recasting*

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our whole Fiscal system'; 'to *uphold* the unity of the Empire'; 'all *dwelt* on the grave injury'; 'his somewhat *shattered* authority'; 'the policy of evasion now *pursued*'. Intentional metaphors are of course less plentiful: 'the home-rule motion designed to *"draw"* Sir Henry'; 'a *dissolving view* of General Elections'; 'the *scattered remnants* of that party might *rally after the disastrous defeat*'.

4. The following essay is adapted from *Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition*. Please read it carefully and write a well-organized mini-essay of **less than 200 words** to discuss your opinion on the following statement "Pragmatic meaning emerges interactively while language is so being used." You may include in your essay the definition you would like to assign to the so-called 'pragmatic meaning.'(30%)

Given the experientialist position that meaning arises from our bodily experiences and given that our experiences are physically and culturally constrained, it seems plausible to assume that thought, understood as cognitive and cultural structure, shapes language. For example, our understanding of reason as COMPLUSIVE FORCE gives rise to linguistic expressions such as Sweetser (1990: 7) insightfully points out, the fact that we have universal, perceptually determined possible options for understanding a particular concept does not preclude the possibility that the lexicalization of one option in a given culture, as opposed to the lexicalization of another option in another culture, may influence the way people understand this concept. In fact, as Mey (1993: 301) claims, language develops in social interaction, but "once the world has been worded, it influences our ways of looking at our environment". If it is possible to support the view that thought shapes language and at the same time claim that the possibility of the reverse procedure cannot be eliminated, then it is legitimate to look for a characterization of language that allows the dialectical survival of both options. I shall argue that the dialectical relation between language and thought can be captured by the institutional character of language, which also leads to a re-definition of pragmatic study.

In an earlier exploration of conceptual metaphors in financial discourse (Marmaridou 1991a), Marmaridou argued that the pervasive conceptualization of financial affairs in terms of personification metaphors does not only shape the way we think about finances in general, but also tends to define our sociocultural identity, thus affecting and controlling the way we live our lives. Underlying this claim is the metaphorical understanding of language as an institution. Institutions are social constructs in so far as they are created by social interaction. Moreover, they have an experiential and imaginative character: arising from the experience of social reality, they do not correspond to any directly understood physical reality, and hence are imaginatively structured in terms of metaphorical mappings and particular image schemas. Once created, institutions form part of our experience and our social identity. They are endowed with social meaning, thus constructing social reality and the self.

The parallelism with language is probably obvious. Language is created in society as a symbolic means of framing experience. More specifically, since meaning emerges from an understanding of experience and

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since it is symbolically expressed in linguistic form, it follows that linguistic form expresses how human beings understand experience, or, alternatively, how they conceptualize reality. Once created, language is itself experienced by human beings as a means of communication and thought. Because human beings experience language as members of a particular linguistic community, they actually experience a specific symbolic form of their physical and social experiences. Presumably, one way of experiencing symbolic form is by using it, that is, by using language. In using and manipulating symbolic form, human beings use and manipulate the structure of this form. In so doing, human beings also manipulate the structure of their physical and social experiences. In other words, they manipulate of the structure of reality in a meaningful way. Moreover, the manipulation of the structure of symbolic form is maintained, the reality it symbolizes is also maintained and reproduced. To the extent that symbolic form changes, the reality it symbolizes also changes. In either case, maintenance or change of symbolic form and corresponding conceptualizations of experience are necessarily constrained by cognitive structure. In this sense, the relation between language and thought can be described as dialectal.

In view of the embodiment-of-form hypothesis and on the basis of the proposed dialectal relation between language and thought, a new definition of pragmatics emerges as the study of the use of language to structure reality as meaningful experience. More specifically, in the embodiment hypothesis it is explicitly claimed that the same neural and cognitive structures and mechanisms that are responsible for perception and sensimotor control also create our conceptual system via processes of neutral co-activation. Cognitive structures, such as image schemas, mental spaces and ICMs, and cognitive mechanisms, such as metaphorical mappings and blendings, are responsible for concept formation. In particular, cognitive structure creates the potential for various conceptualizations of experience.

Given the dialectal relation between thought and language and given that conceptualizations of experience are motivated (not determined) by cognitive structure, one may assume that they are socioculturally licensed and ultimately defined while language is being used during interaction. In this sense, conceptualizations of experience are framed by language specific lexicalizations and grammatical constructions. On the basis of a *connectionist neural network architecture* one may further assume that the repeated use of particular lexicalizations and grammatical constructions triggers conceptualizations of experience during interaction, thereby creating fairly stable routines of neural co-activation. In this way such conceptualizations of experience become neurally entrenched and are maintained and reproduced. Hence, the use of language may be said to be conducive to *conceptual entrenchment*, the latter viewed as the automatic co-activation of neural structure and conceptualizations of experience. In this sense, experience becomes internalized by means of language use.

Given that by using language and manipulating its symbolic form human beings also manipulate the structure of their experience and given that their experiences are meaningful in that they consist of conceptualizations of reality, human beings can be said to use language to structure reality as meaningful experience. Therefore, pragmatic meaning arises interactively while language is so being used.

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